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Abstract 
Biotechnology has enriched the strategy set available to crop managers. Suppose a 
manager faces a decision between applying a pre-emergence pesticide or applying 
nothing at all. The advent of pesticide tolerance traits in plants admits the possibility of a 
state-contingent post-emergence application of pesticide. The innovation adds value in 
large part because it provides the manager with the option to wait for more information. 
For heterogeneous acre types, the determinants of trait royalties and of crop management 
strategies in equilibrium are studied. Pest resistance traits have different implications for 
crop management. Whereas a tolerance trait likely complements information 
technologies, the addition of a resistance trait may substitute for them. 
 
Keywords: genetic trait, information inputs, patent value, real option.
  
 
 
ON THE DEMAND FOR A STATE-CONTINGENT,  
COST-SAVING SEED TRAIT 
Introduction 
Agriculture in North and South America has seen rapid adoption of genetically engi-
neered crop varieties. While demand-side concerns remain as serious impediments to the 
development of markets for these varieties, cost, yield, and risk considerations have 
provided the supply side with strong incentives to adopt them (Kalaitzandonakes 1999). 
This paper is concerned with developing an economic framework to study the advent of a 
patented state-contingent, cost-saving genetic trait for crops vulnerable to a pest hazard 
that requires a costly remedy. 
The class of hazards in question includes a potentially serious weed problem, where a 
herbicide tolerance (HT) trait would provide a cheap ex post solution to the realized 
hazard. In 2000, Hess and Duke wrote: 
To date, herbicides that are used in HT crops are applied post-
emergence, which allows herbicide application based on need. Unless 
the weed population is extreme, the application can be delayed until an 
assessment of the weed population and species present can be made to 
determine the optimum herbicide type and concentration to use. 
It is clear then that HT and other pesticide tolerant (PT) crop varieties provide the 
flexibility to wait for and use additional relevant information about a pest if and when it 
becomes available after crop emergence. The class of hazards in question also includes 
the possibility of an insect infestation, where a pest resistance (PR) trait would obviate 
the need for ex post treatment. Here, too, information and flexibility are important, but, as 
we will clarify, the manner in which they enter the economics of the PR trait context may 
differ significantly from that of the PT trait context.  
PT- and PR-endowed crop varieties have been major factors in reshaping U.S. agri-
input markets from 1996 through 2002 (Fulton and Giannakas 2002; Holmberg 2002; 
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Fernandez-Corneja, Klotz-Ingram, and Jans 2002). And more of the same may be on the 
way for the early years of the twenty-first century. Bridges (2000) documented that the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) had processed some 1,584 permits and notices 
for HT in regulated organisms in 1999, accounting for 27 percent of all such permits and 
notices.1  While not all PT varieties have been genetically engineered, genetic engineer-
ing was involved in the development of such HT varieties as bromoxynil tolerant cotton 
(brought to market in 1995), glufosinate tolerant canola and corn (1997), and glyphosate 
tolerant soybean, canola, cotton, and corn (1996–98). As for PR traits, Bridges identified 
2,646 permits and notices on such organisms, the large majority being for insect and virus 
resistance.2  While commercialized Bt corn, cotton, and potatoes are the best known 
instances of PR varieties, potato varieties resistant to the potato leaf roll virus are also on 
the commercial market.3 
Although growers quickly may see the merits of a trait, there is no reason to suppose 
that adoption should be complete, even if trait-endowed varieties receive the same price 
as conventional varieties (Fulton and Keyowski 1999). Because of location, past cropping 
practices, or other reasons, acres vary in their susceptibility to any given hazard (Carlson, 
Marra, and Hubbell 1997). Also, the differences in growers’ attitudes toward risks affect 
the private value of a trait (Hurley, Mitchell, and Rice 2002). Therefore, the optimal 
strategy for one acre may not be optimal for another. 
While the advent of a genetically modified variety may simplify the managerial de-
cision process, it does so by enriching the strategy space available to the manager. A 
newly available strategy may involve low managerial time requirements (e.g., the need 
to crop scout may no longer arise), but the manager must choose to adopt that strategy 
in the first place. Consider the case of a PT trait. Before the commercialization of the 
tolerance-endowed variety, the manager may have had to decide between (A) incurring 
a prevention cost to better insure against the hazard, or (B) saving on the prevention 
cost but taking a yield risk. When the PT variety is available, the strategy space be-
comes (A) as described, using conventional seed, or (B) as described, using 
conventional seed, or (C) pay a premium for the trait so that post-emergence remedia-
tion of the pest hazard becomes feasible. Our paper inquires into the consequences of 
enriching the strategy space in this manner.  
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The problem we seek to shed light on is important for at least two reasons. First, it 
illustrates a mechanism through which biotechnology and information technology 
interact in the ongoing disturbances to the structure of agriculture in the Americas. The 
biotechnology aspect of the problem is clear, whereas the information technology aspect 
may be less readily apparent. However, upon reflection on strategy C, it should be 
apparent that the contribution of strategy C to value is predicated upon the revelation of 
additional information over the intervening time period.4 Thus in our context, and as will 
be made clearer in the paper, biotechnology can be an enabling technology that places a 
premium on a good information structure. We will show that, depending upon the charac-
ter of the trait, biotechnologies and information technologies can complement or 
substitute. If the nature of the interactions is predominantly complementary, then it would 
not be surprising if both of these classes of technology inputs emerged as relevant inputs 
in crop agriculture at approximately the same time. 
Second, and not unrelated to the first, the addition of strategy C has non-trivial im-
plications both for the intensity of agri-chemical use and for the intensity of soil 
cultivation. As agri-chemicals and intense cultivation tend to generate negative social 
externalities, a comprehensive study of the enriched strategy space should be illuminating 
for environmental policy formation. 
One of the traditional claims for integrated pest management (IPM) and organic farm-
ing practices is that a deeper understanding of one’s farm permits more considered 
husbandry practices. A cost-saving genetic trait may be a technical substitute or comple-
ment for a developed data bank of knowledge about the land one manages. A PT trait is a 
substitute if it eliminates the need for such information. This would be true for information 
that allows an early judgment on the likely hazard because the PT trait permits the post-
ponement of the application decision. But the PT trait also complements a developed data 
bank of knowledge about the post-emergence pest status of the crop. However, because PT 
traits are relatively novel, growers will have had little incentive to develop a data base on 
assessing pest hazards after the crop has emerged. Thus, PT traits, and through similar 
reasoning also PR traits, may alter the composition of data sets that growers have incen-
tives to develop. But, regardless of the nature of a grower’s extant data set, it does not 
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necessarily follow that the more informed farmer would be more parsimonious with inputs. 
Neither does it necessarily follow that a PT trait will reduce the levels of pesticide applica-
tions. And the impact may change over time as the grower develops more of the sorts of 
data bases that are privately optimal in the new environment.  
The class of problems we will address fits most clearly into the real options frame-
work. A basic tenet underpinning this literature is that information has value to the extent 
that it can change actions. In our stylized problem, biotechnology provides the grower 
with a costly option to defer an action until more information becomes available. A PT 
trait has the characteristics of a commodity call option in the sense that the biotechnology 
provides the opportunity to place a floor on crop value in the event of a pest infestation. 
This option may be availed of by paying the (strike) price of a post-emergence pesticide 
application. There exists a large literature on valuing such an option and on its implica-
tions for actions on the part of the firm (Arrow and Fisher 1974; McDonald and Siegel 
1986; Trigeorgis 1998), and we too will study how option values affect decisions. We 
also will inquire into the implications of grower-level contributors to option value on 
patent royalties. 
Related problems have been analyzed in the agricultural production economics lit-
erature. Feinerman, Choi, and Johnson (1990) studied split nitrogen strategies where 
early application was easy but relatively inefficient at the margin, while late application 
possibly was not feasible because of weather conditions. In this environment, there is a 
negative option to wait and apply a late dressing. Ex ante, the risk that weather will turn 
out wet is traded off against the expectation over the gain if nitrogen can be used more 
effectively. In that work, however, there is no innovative technology that enriches the 
strategy space. 
Site-specific agriculture techniques provide the flexibility necessary for real options 
to exist. These techniques enrich grower strategy spaces and complement information 
technologies in the form of global positioning satellites, mapping systems, and nutrient 
tests (Fee 2002). Babcock and Pautch (1998), to name just one work, have investigated 
the application and profit implications of this technology complex. For corn in Iowa, they 
concluded that the option to condition application rates on geographic information 
increased mean yields and reduced mean application rates.5 
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Our inquiry proceeds with a formalization of a basic two-period environment for 
pesticide application when acres are heterogeneous and a post-emergence application of 
the input is precluded. After analyzing this decision-making environment, the PT tech-
nology is introduced and we inquire into the determinants of equilibrium royalties and 
equilibrium varietal plantings. This is followed by a consideration of how heterogeneity 
in types might affect trait value. We then briefly modify our model to accommodate PR 
traits. The paper concludes with a deliberation on some additional issues that might 
warrant formal analysis. In particular, we emphasize the effects of trait innovations on the 
local demand for farm management expertise. 
 
Basic Model for the Pesticide Tolerant Trait 
The model has three time points where the earliest, time point 0, occurs at planting. 
Time point 1 occurs just after crop emergence, and it may be possible to take an action at 
this time. Time point 2 is at harvest, when crop value is realized. Crop value depends on 
pest damage, where pest hazards are random at time point 0 but are non-random at time 
point 1. As always, the approach taken is to work backwards to solve the problem so that 
the state-contingent optimal strategies are built into the decision problem that the grower 
tries to solve.   
Acreage susceptibility to pest damage is determined by a large number of factors in-
cluding cropping history, weather conditions, the use of neighboring land, and past 
husbandry practices. We capture this heterogeneity in cropland acres through the con-
tinuously distributed infestation severity index, q . The parameter has a continuous 
cumulative mass distribution ( ): [ , ]l uH  q q q ®  [0, 1] with u H( )    1ºq . Mass density is 
h(q), and we hold that 1( ) 1u  H q º  for any mass distribution 
1( ):[ , ] [0,1]l u  H q q q ®  that 
might replace H(q) in our analysis so that cropping area is held to be fixed. A grower of 
acre type q  knows the type at time point 0.  
The pest-free crop has value niV  at time point 2 where the subscript may be taken to 
abbreviate “no infestation.” This value is gross of the costs of buying and applying the 
pesticide, but the cost of standard variety seed has been removed. The seed market is 
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assumed to be competitive. If infested, the acre has time point 2 value iV  to the grower 
where i niV V£ . This value is random, when viewed from time point 0, with a type-
conditioned distribution ( | )iG V q  that has a strictly positive support on [0, ]niV . We hold 
that all growers know the distributions ( | )iG V q  that are pertinent to them at time point 0, 
so that there does not exist heterogeneity in grower information sets on land husbanded. 
It is also held that ( | ) 0  [ 0 ] [ ]i i ni l uG V          V     , V  ,       , q q ³ " Î " q Î q q  in order to model 
the increasing severity of infestation. Here, the subscripted q  indicates a differentiation. 
The derivative attribute asserts that conditional distributions are ordered by first-degree 
stochastic dominance. As a special example, the q-conditioned expectation of crop value, 
{ | }iE V  =q   0 ( | )
niV
i i V  dG V   qò  is (weakly) decreasing in q. This may be written as  
 { | } 0 [ ]i l uE V         , q q £ "qÎ q q . 
The acre can be sprayed with pesticide at cost per acre r = s + F. Here r < Vni is the 
total cost per acre of spraying the crop, s > 0 is the market cost per acre of the chemical, 
and F = 0 is the fixed per acre cost of spraying. The broad-spectrum pesticide kills all 
pests and is toxic to the crop so that, absent the PT trait, it cannot be applied after crop 
emergence. Absent an innovation, the grower has two alternatives at time point 0; (A) to 
spray at time point 0, or (B) not to spray at all. If strategy A is chosen, the gross crop 
value is Vni at time point 2 (harvest), while if strategy B is chosen, the gross crop value is 
realized asVi.6 
 
Absent the Innovation: To Spray or Not to Spray 
The per acre value of strategy A to the risk-neutral producer is ( )a niU   = V rq - , where  
the expression is invariant to q. If the grower gambles by refraining from spraying, strategy B, 
then the expected value of the strategy is ( ) { | }b iU  = E V  q q . Since ( ) / { | }b idU  d  = E V   qq q q     
= 0 = ( ) /adU  dq q , the acre type so that both strategies deliver the same expected value is 
given by ,b aq , defined as the solution to  
On the Demand for a State-Contingent, Cost-Saving Seed Trait / 7 
 
 
 ,{ | }.ni i b aV r E V q- =  (1) 
The solution may not be unique because { | }iE V  q  is only weakly decreasing in q. 
However, the solution set forms a convex set, which we call b, aQ . As is standard practice, 
we choose to study the impact of changes on , , , ,ˆ sup{ :  }b a b a b a b a = q q q ÎQ  (Milgrom and 
Roberts 1996). In our context, the assumption asserts that indifferent types elect for 
strategy B. Acre types in ,ˆ( ]b a u, q q  are sprayed before planting, while acre types in 
,[ ]l b a, q q  are not sprayed. It merits observation that threshold type ,b aq  is invariant to 
mass distribution ( )H q .  
Suppose now that the pesticide is off-patent and is produced competitively. With w 
as the constant unit cost of producing the chemical, we have s = w so that ,ˆ( )b aH q  acres 
are sprayed where ( ) 1 ( )H  =  Hq - q  is the type’s mass distribution survival function. We 
have ,ˆ /b ad dw =q   / { | } 0i1 E V   > q- q  from (1) above so that acres under the “don’t spray” 
strategy varies directly with the price of spray, i.e., ,ˆ( )/ 0b adH dwq ³ . We also have that if 
1( ) ( )H   Hq ® q  where ( )H q ³   1( ) [ ]l u    , H q "qÎ q q  (i.e., first-order dominance in the 
mass distribution of types), then ˆ( )b,aH q   
1 ˆ( )b,aH£ q . That is, acreage sprayed increases 
when the distribution of the infestation index becomes more densely massed towards the 
upper bound, qu. Alternatively, let ( | )iG V   q ®  
1( | )iG V  q  such that 
_ ( | ) [ ] [0 ]1i i l u i niG(   )  le  V      , ,  V   , VV Gq q " qÎ q q " Î  and the probability of a given loss in 
value rises for each value of q. Then, from (1), { | }iE V  q  declines for each value of q so 
that 1, , ,ˆ ˆ ˆb a b a b a  q ® q £ q  and 
1ˆ ˆ( ) ( )b,a b,a H  Hq £ q . Acreage sprayed increases when the 
expected crop value declines for each acre type. 
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The Innovation and Grower Actions 
Now a technology provider develops and patents the technology underpinning a 
modified seed that allows the spray to be applied at time point 1, i.e., when it has been 
established whether a pest problem exists. The grower can now pay a technology fee t in 
order to enrich its strategy space to include a third strategy, strategy C. This strategy 
entails a deferral of the pesticide application decision until after crop emergence so that 
the information set is larger when the decision is made. Then, in our stylized model, an 
application of the pesticide on the infested crop will completely restore crop value Vni. 
We assume that, after waiting, a grower can determine without noise what the crop value 
would be if the opportunity to spray is not taken up. Thus, a pesticide application will 
occur if and only if ni iV  r  V- > . The strategy C payoff is max[  , ] ni iV r V  - - t , and the 
state-contingent payoffs for the three time-0 strategies are provided in Figure 1. 
For the grower, the risk-neutral value of the decision to wait for more information is  
 ( ) {max[  , ] | } c ni iU  = E V r  Vq - q - t  (2) 
with ( ) / {max[ , ] | }c ni idU  d  = E V r V  qq q - q . It is readily shown that 0 ( ) /a = dU dq q  
( )/c  dU d³ q q ( )/bdU d³ q q  so that strategy A is least sensitive to type and strategy B is most 
sensitive.7 The intuition behind these inequalities can be found by comparing the strategy 
payoffs Vni – r for A, max[Vni – r, Vi] for C, and Vi for B. The strategy A payoff is clearly 
independent of Vi, and so of q. Strategy C has limited dependence on Vi, and so on q, 
because the grower can remedy the problem ex post. The strategy B payoff is not shielded in 
any way from Vi and so is the most sensitive to q. 
To clarify the effect of the seed trait premium, Figure 1 shows that strategy C is 
dominant in all states of nature when the trait price is 0 because the trait innovation has 
provided the grower with a real option of waiting for more information. Then it is clear 
that ( )cU q ³  max[ ( ) , ( )]baU Uq q  or {max[ , ] | }  max[ , { | }]ni i ni iE V r V V r E V- q ³ - q  
because {max[ , ] | } = ( )ni i ni aE V r V V r U- q ³ - q  and {max[ , ] | } { | }ni i iE V r V E V- q ³ q .
8 
In other words, when t = 0 then the free “option to spray” strategy is preferred over  
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FIGURE 1. Comparison of ex post values of the three strategies 
 
either of the other strategies because it combines the best outcomes of the other strate-
gies but at no extra cost. 
An interpretation of strategy C in Figure 1 that focuses on the maximization state-
ment might view the option to spray as a long call commodity option on Vi with strike 
price : ( )ni cV  r  U  =- q  {max[ ( ), 0] | } + ( ) i ni niE V V r V r- - q - - t . The strike price is the 
realization of Vi such that the grower is indifferent between spraying post-emergence and 
not spraying at that time.  
We will now establish how the continuum of types may be partitioned according to 
strategies taken when t > 0. Notice that the type that is indifferent between strategies A 
and C, qc,a, solves  
 ,{min[ , ] | }.ni i c a = r E r V Vt - - q  (3) 
As with qb,a, there may not be a unique solution. The solution set, ,c aQ , is convex, 
and we study , , , ,ˆ sup{ : }c a c a c a c a= q q q ÎQ  so that ties are assigned to Strategy C. Calculus  
10 / Hennessy and Saak 
 
FIGURE 2. Partition of types by seed and spraying strategies adopted 
 
then establishes ,ˆ / 1/ {min[ , ] | } < 0c a ni id d = E r V Vqq t - - q . Notice also that the type(s) that 
is indifferent between time 0 strategies C and B, , ,b c b cq Î Q , solves  
 ,{max[ , 0] | }.ni i b c= E V r Vt - - q  (4) 
With , , , ,ˆ = sup{ : }b c b c b c b c q q q ÎQ , then ,ˆ / 1/E {max[ ,0]| } > 0b c ni id d V r Vqq t = - - q .  
The partition of types adopting different strategies is as given in Figure 2, where, as 
we will show shortly, , , ,ˆ ˆ ˆb c b a c aq £ q £ q . Low q types do not spray at all because the 
expected damage does not warrant the cost of a certain spray or the cost of an option to 
spray. Intermediate types are willing to buy the option to spray, at premium t. High types 
may spray anyway because the price t exceeds the value that these types place on flexi-
bility. In light of Figure 2 we have that the t-conditioned interval ˆ ˆ( ( ) ( )]b,c c,a,q t q t  is 
squeezed on both sides as t increases. 
Figure 3 depicts the impacts of an increase in t on the partition of types according to 
strategies chosen. The function ( ; 0)cU =q t  must be higher than both ( )bU q  and ( )cU q  
because, as we have already demonstrated, ( ; 0) max[ ( ), ( )]c b aU   = U Uq t ³ q q . As t 
increases, ( )cU q  shifts down so that the vertical difference between curves is the constant 
t. Function ( )cU q  must cut function ( )bU q  from below because 
( ) / ( ) /c bdU d dU dq q ³ q q , while function ( )cU q  must cut function ( )aU q  from above 
because ( ) / ( ) / 0c adU d  dU dq q £ q q = .
9  The “choke” price, above which no acre is  
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FIGURE 3. Effect of trait price on partition of types by strategies chosen 
 
planted under a PT seed, is given by t+ where t+ is defined by q+ = +ˆ ˆ( ) ( )c,a b,c =
+q t q t . It 
is clear that, as in (1) above, ,ˆ b a
+q º q . 
Next we engage in a farm-level (i.e., partial equilibrium) analysis of the strategies 
chosen. Let g parameterize a mean-preserving spread in ( | )iG V q  for all q. From (3) and 
the concavity of the function min[ , ]ni ir V V-  in Vi, it is clear that ( ) / 0c,ad dq t g ³ ; an 
increase in the variability of an infestation, given that it occurs, increases the prospects of 
getting by without spraying. Purchasing the option to spray caps the loss at r. The oppor-
tunity to limit downside risk and yet benefit from upside potential will dispose the grower 
toward waiting rather than spraying for certain. 
Applying (4), the convexity of the function max[ ,0]ni iV r V- -  in Vi assures us that 
,
ˆ /b cd dq g   0£ . Owning the time 0 option to spray becomes more valuable, relative to 
either not owning or not spraying before emergence, when Vi becomes more random for 
any q. This is because the option provided by the trait establishes a floor on the crop 
12 / Hennessy and Saak 
value net of spraying costs, Vni – r. The increase in risk provides more in the way of 
upside potential from spraying if an infestation warrants it but has limited effect on 
downside consequences. Therefore, acres switch from strategy B to strategy C at any 
given trait premium value, t. We can see then that the (t, g)-conditioned interval, 
,
ˆ ˆ( ( ) ( )]b,c c a, , ,q t g q t g , of acres on which PT seed is planted expands on both sides as g 
increases. 
Summarizing our characterization of the types that buy the trait, we can write the 
following:10  
 
RESULT 1. For exogenous trait value, 0t ³ , 
a. , ,ˆ ˆc a b cq ³ q , 
b. 2 1 2 1( , ) ( , ) ,
c cI I  t g Í t g "t ³ t "g  where ,ˆ ˆ( , ) ( ( , ), ( , )]
c
b,c c aI  =   t g q t g q t g , 
c. 2 12 1( , ) ( , ) 0,
c cI I   t Ê t "t ³ "g ³ gg g . 
 
Part (b) points to an issue that does not appear to be generally recognized. Observe first 
that the innovation can be effectively “un-invented” by increasing price t to an arbitrarily 
large value. Then, while a decline in t would increase demand for the option to wait, part 
(b) does not assert where the weight of the increase in demand would come from. Viewing 
Figure 2, suppose that the distribution of types is massed largely toward the right. Then the 
innovation will reduce demand for the chemical. If, however, the distribution is massed 
largely toward the left, then demand for the chemical may rise on average after the innova-
tion as growers find new uses for the (now) more versatile chemical. 
Part (c) also warrants further reflection. It is the time point 1 revelation of complete 
information about the extent of the time point 1 pest problem that motivates an increase 
in demand for the trait as the amount of initial uncertainty increases. Our model is not 
general enough to rigorously support the assertion that it is the acquisition of information 
over the period between a pre-emergence pesticide application and any post-emergence 
application that strengthens demand for the trait. Nonetheless, this intuition seems well-
founded, and the PT trait technology likely complements information technologies or 
On the Demand for a State-Contingent, Cost-Saving Seed Trait / 13 
 
 
managerial capacities that enable the manager to acquire and process relevant informa-
tion over the pre-emergence, post-emergence interval. However, if all relevant 
information were known pre-emergence, then the trait would have zero value because 
there would be no option value to waiting. 
 
Equilibrium Value of Tolerance Trait 
Now we turn to the decision environment of the firm that holds the patent on the ge-
netic trait. The firm is assumed to license the trait to seed companies for a royalty per bag 
of seed sold, and the seed companies pass the fee directly on to seed consumers. Total 
royalties amount to 
 ˆ ˆ( ; ) ( ) ( )c,a b,cR H H .t g = t q - t q  (5) 
Given that trait production costs are sunk, the patent holder will choose a value of t that 
sets marginal revenue equal to zero. Part (c) of Result 1 then readily yields the following. 
 
RESULT 2. Receipts from trait royalties increase with a mean-preserving spread in 
( | )iG V q  on all u[ , ]lqÎ q q . 
 
To ascertain this, suppose that 1=t t  is chosen to maximize the value of (5) for a 
given value g = g1. Then the value of g increases to g = g2. From part (c) of Result 1 we 
have that demand, ˆ ˆ( ) ( )c,a b,cH Hq - q , increases for 1=t t . And the re-optimized value of 
2( ; )R  t g  can be no smaller than 1 2( ; )R  t g . So there exists a 2=t t  such that 
2 2 1 2 1 1( ; ) ; ) ( ; )R R( R  t g ³ t g ³ t g .
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Distribution of Types 
The analysis underlying Figure 3 suggests that it is to the benefit of the trait mo-
nopolist for types to be intermediate in value rather than massed at the extremes of the 
types interval. Economic intuition might suggest that what is good for the trait mo-
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nopolist would be bad for the aggregate welfare of growers. In this section we will 
provide precise conditions under which a reduction in heterogeneity among acres is to 
the benefit of the trait monopolist. 
We already have noted from equations (3) and (4) that the values of indifferent types 
qc,a and qb,c are not directly dependent on the mass distribution H(q). Fixing the value of 
t, suppose now that mass is shifted from outside the interval ˆ ˆ( ) ( ( ), ( )]c b,c c,aI =t q t q t  to 
inside the interval. This certainly will be to the benefit of the trait patent holder because 
profit increases at any fixed trait price. However, and albeit indirectly, the sort of shift 
that we have just outlined is dependent upon the initial mass distribution H(q) because 
H(q) determines the monopolist’s trait pricing decision. It has already been shown that 
ˆ ˆ( ) ( ( ), ( )]c b,c c,aI =t q t q t  contracts to the point ,ˆ b aq  as   
+t ® t . If   +t < t , then demand for 
the trait will always increase whenever the distribution of types undergoes a contraction 
about ,ˆ b aq .  
 
DEFINITION 1. Mass distribution H(q) is said to undergo a contraction about ,ˆ a bq  if 
( )H  q ®   1H ( )q  such that 1 ( ) ( )u u
l l
dH =  dHq q
q q
q qò ò  and 1( )  ( )B B dH  dHq qò ò  for all inter-
vals B Í  [ , ]l uq q  such that ,ˆ b a Bq Î . 
 
This form of contraction need not be mean-preserving. It could be either mean-
increasing or mean-decreasing. But if it does preserve the mean then the contraction is a 
mean-preserving contraction (mpc) in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970). Fur-
ther, not every mpc is an mpc about ,ˆ b aq . In fact, a little work would demonstrate that 
even if ,ˆ ( )
u
lb a
=   dHq
q
q q qò , then an mpc in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz would not 
necessarily satisfy the definition. An immediate consequence of the fact that a mass shift 
in types satisfying the definition increases trait demand for all trait prices is as follows: 
 
RESULT 3. If the distribution of acre types undergoes a contraction about qb,a then the 
trait patent holder’s profits increase. 
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The Pesticide Resistance Trait 
This section outlines the impacts that the addition of the PR trait innovation would 
have on strategies and trait royalties. The strategy of sowing the PR trait at time 0 is 
labeled strategy D. As before, let there be three time points, 0, 1, and 2. At time point 0 
the variety is purchased and planted. It may be a PT variety or a PR variety where the 
trait premium on the PR variety is r. The traits will not be stacked because the PT trait 
provides no value in addition to the PR variety. The PR premium must not exceed the 
cost of a pre-emergence spray, r, because otherwise strategy A would dominate the 
strategy of planting a PR variety, i.e., strategy D. If the resistance trait is purchased, then 
value is assuredly Vni – r. 
Equating expected payoffs under the resistant variety and the PT variety, the trait pre-
mium such that the risk-neutral grower managing a type q acre is indifferent is given by 
 {max[ , ] | }  = E{min[ , ] | }  .ni ni i ni i = V E V r V r V Vr - - q + t - q + t  (6) 
This establishes the determinants of the magnitude of the positive number r – t. Further, 
because min[ , ]ni ir V V-  is concave in crop value, we can see that the private value added 
of the PR trait relative to the PT trait is decreasing in a mean-preserving spread of the 
random variable. Even without the PR trait, the grower has an insured floor in that a time-
point 1 spray is possible. With only the PT trait we already have observed that the 
grower’s position may be viewed as a long call option on the commodity. Then, the time 
0 value of the position increases as the riskiness of any infestation increases. With the 
more valuable PR trait instead, this risk becomes irrelevant because the insured floor is 
replaced by complete insurance. 
In an environment where growers are less than perfectly informed, growers of a PT 
variety likely will not execute their time-1 option well. Therefore, the likely impact of 
less information is to reduce the value of {max[ , ] | }ni iE V r V- q . From (6) we then see 
that, upon fixing the acre type, the likely impact on r is for it to increase under less 
information. Thus, in a less well informed environment and when the pesticide tolerance 
trait price is fixed, more acres likely will be sown to the PR variety because poor-quality 
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information is not a problem under the latter technology. Consequently, the PR trait 
likely substitutes for a decision environment in which good post-emergence pest informa-
tion is available.  
 
Conclusion 
In this paper we have placed state-contingent, cost-saving crop traits in a real options 
framework so as to better understand the implications of such traits for equilibrium 
production strategies when acres are heterogeneous. The analysis may warrant an exten-
sion to look more closely at welfare effects. Also, an elaboration to capture the effect of a 
novel trait on incentives to accumulate information about the decisions that may have to 
be made may be worth the effort. While undoubtedly challenging, such an extension 
would provide insights into the effects of trait innovations on temporal patterns in agri-
input use. Policies to promote or deter the use of a trait because of alleged environmental 
effects may be formed after viewing the short-run effects on input use. But, given that 
growers in a relatively uninformed decision environment likely will avail themselves of 
new strategic opportunities, it is not immediately clear that the long-run effects on input 
use will be qualitatively the same as the shorter-run effects. 
At the most general level, we conclude that while biotechnology trait innovations, 
agri-chemical use, and demand for farm-level information acquisition and processing 
inputs are intimately related, broad statements about the nature of interactions should be 
treated with some suspicion. Nonetheless, we end with some speculations that might 
warrant further inquiry. 
While interactions between technology choices and input choices may generally re-
veal themselves over a relatively short time span, this is likely to be less true for some 
aspects of choices in information processing capacities. Education and the acquisition of 
skills are key issues here. To the extent that education strengthens managerial competen-
cies in processing information, a biotechnology trait that demands, say, extensive 
decision making may find more adopters in a well-educated farm sector. And then, 
information and information management inputs will increase as factors in agricultural 
outputs. Further, the demand for education as an input in the sector will strengthen. But 
human capital formation can be a long-run phenomenon, and it may take some years for 
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enlightening empirical evidence to accumulate on how biotechnology interacts with the 
demand for education on the part of farm managers. Even in the more general set of 
agricultural technologies, Huffman (2001) has identified a dearth of research on how 
schooling, information acquisition, and technology adoption decisions interrelate. 
Shifts in the structure of consumer preferences are likely to strengthen the need for 
such research. The growing market penetration of the organic food movement (Duram 
1998), with its disposition toward technology choices that are conditioned on the produc-
tion environment, will require of growers the capacity to acquire and use information in 
matching the environment with the suite of available production technologies. Also, the 
U.S. Food Quality Protection Act of 1996 may eventually result in the removal of a large 
number of pesticides from many of their agricultural uses. Food quality traits, including 
visual traits, likely are luxuries. Producers seeking to satisfy the demands of increasingly 
affluent consumers may have to recourse to a mixed bag of environment-specific tech-
nologies. The decision environment may become more complicated, and there may be 
premiums for managers who know their production environment well enough to judi-
ciously exercise their technology options. 
On the other hand, if PR and other genetic traits substitute for informed farm-level 
decision making, then the agricultural crop economy may become more centralized. The 
information disadvantages facing cropland renters would become relatively less severe, 
while scale economies in asset management and reduced unit input costs may dominate 
in determining firm structure.
  
 
Endnotes 
1. The number excludes non-regulated technologies and thus likely significantly 
undercounts innovation in this area. 
2. Bridges’s numbers broadly concur with field trial data presented in National Re-
search Council 2000, page 170. 
3. By July 2002, rootworm resistant corn seed by Monsanto had received most of the 
clearances necessary for commercial use in the United States. 
4. MacRae (2002) writes, “The basis of Precision Agriculture is applying agrochemi-
cals only where necessary. The point of Integrated Pest Management is to apply 
pesticide only when it is necessary. By using these technologies in IPM, we can de-
velop ‘Precision IPM,’ only applying pesticides where and when it is necessary.”  
5. Other recent work in agricultural production economics has applied the continuous 
time stochastic diffusion tools that are, perhaps, most readily associated with real op-
tions theory. These include Saphores’s (2000) work on intra-season control of fruit 
crop pests through a sequence of sprays. The real option we identify fits naturally into 
a two-period model, and we have no need to adopt the parametric constraints that at-
tend the continuous time framework. 
6. Note in particular that we have assumed that no reinfestation occurs if strategy A is 
chosen. 
7. We have ( ) ( ) {max[ ,0 ] | }c b ni iU U = E V r Vq - q - - q - t  with non-negative derivative. 
And we have ( ) ( ) {min[ , ] | }+a c ni iU U = E r V V rq - q - q t - , again with non-negative 
derivative. 
8. This can also be seen as an application of Jensen’s inequality since the function  
max[Vni – r, Vi] is convex in Vi. 
9. See the calculations in endnote 7. 
10. It is only due to the convention that distribution functions are right continuous that 
Ic(t, g) is open on the left. 
11. The comparative statics of t are somewhat more involved. Assumptions are then 
required on the distribution of types in order to guarantee an unique equilibrium. Some 
results are available from the authors upon request.
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